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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This comment originates from a debate that the Akron Law 
Federalist Society at the University of Akron School of Law hosted.  
The participants considered the legalities of U.S. policies with respect to 
the detention, interrogation, and trial of detainees held in Guantanamo 
Bay.  This Comment analyzes some of the legal issues discussed during 
that debate and also touches on recent issues related to the detention and 
trials of detainees held in Guantanamo Bay.   
 
 Kyndra Rotunda is an Associate Professor of Military and International Law at Chapman 
University, Executive Director of the Military Law & Policy Institute and AMVETS Legal Clinic, 
Lecturer at Berkeley Law, former Army JAG Officer (Major), former Guantanamo Bay Prosecutor, 
and author of HONOR BOUND:  INSIDE THE GUANTANAMO TRIALS (Carolina Academic Press 2008), 
and MILITARY AND VETERANS LAW (West Publishing 2011). 
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II.  LAW GOVERNING MILITARY COMMISSIONS
1
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. Military, under President George 
W. Bush’s Administration, began holding enemy combatants captured in 
the Global War on Terror, at the U.S. Naval base in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.
2
  On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an Executive 
Order that laid the groundwork to bring some of these detainees to trial 
before military commission.
3
  Section four of that same order instructed 
the Secretary of Defense to draft rules governing Military 
Commissions.
4
  At a minimum, the President directed full and fair trials 
with a commission that decides both fact and law; allows the admission 
of any evidence having probative value to a reasonable person; protects 
classified information, provides for conviction and sentence by a two-
thirds majority; and requires review of the trial record by either the 
Secretary of Defense or the President himself.
5
 
Responding to the President, the Secretary of Defense then drafted 
Military Commission Order Number One, which succinctly set forth 
procedures for military commissions.
6
  Section five, entitled Procedures 
Accorded to the Accused, guaranteed the accused several rights, which 
included a copy of charges in the defendant’s language; the presumption 
of innocence until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; assigned 
defense counsel; provided access to information the prosecution intends 
to use at trial and any evidence tending to exculpate the defendant; 
guaranteed that the defendant is not required to testify against himself, 
but may testify on his own behalf (the right to remain silent); guaranteed 
the defendant’s right to be present except when it violates laws 
governing classified information or when the defendant is disruptive; 
allowed the detainee access to information used in sentencing; afforded 
the right to present evidence and to make a statement at a sentencing 
 
 1. For a more detailed discussion of Military Commissions, see Kyndra Rotunda, HONOR 
BOUND:  INSIDE THE GUANTANAMO TRIALS 147-63 (2008). 
 2. For a discussion of the historical, legal underpinnings of Military Commissions dating to 
the Revolutionary War, see Kyndra Rotunda, A Comparative Historical Analysis of War Time 
Procedural Protections and Presidential Powers:  From the Civil War to the War on Terror, 12 
CHAPMAN L. REV 449 (2009). 
 3. President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 67, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Detention, Treatment & Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 
FR 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 6. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMM’N ORDER NO. 1 (Aug. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2005/d20050902order.pdf. 
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hearing; guaranteed open public trials; and afforded protection against 
double jeopardy.
7
   
In the summer of 2006, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
8
 
invalidated military commissions on statutory grounds, holding that 
President Bush must first receive specific approval from Congress 
before using military tribunals to try suspected wartime criminals.
9
  The 
Court did not determine that military commissions were 
unconstitutional.  Instead, the Court simply called on Congress to either 
approve the rules or to codify new ones.  The Court interpreted 
Congress’s “Authorization for the Use of Military Force” not to allow 
the President to hold Military Commissions and said that Congress must 
specifically approve Military Commissions.
10
  The Court added, 
“Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the 
authority he believes necessary. . . If Congress, after due consideration, 
deems it appropriate to change the controlling statutes, in conformance 
with the constitution and other laws, it has the prerogative to do so.”
11
 
Congress responded to the Supreme Court and specifically 
authorized Military Commissions by adopting a set of rules, which it 
codified in the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
12
  The rules reflected 
much of what was already contained in the Military Commission Order 
Number One.  Generally, the rules excluded information obtained by 
torture,
13
 guaranteed defendants the right to represent themselves,
14
 
guaranteed that defendants cannot be excluded from their trials except 
when they are disruptive and only after being warned by the judge,
15
 and 
protected the sources and methods of classified information.
16
  Further, 
the rules allowed defendants to appeal their convictions to the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court, and, in some cases, ultimately to the United 
States Supreme Court.
17
   
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 636-37. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Military Comm’n Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006).  
 13. Id. § 948r(a)(“A statement obtained by use of torture shall not be admissible in a military 
commission under this chapter, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the 
statement was made”).  
 14. Id. § 948a(b)(D).  
 15. Id. §§ 948a, 949d(e).  
 16. Id. §§ 948a, 949d(f).  
 17. Id. §§ 948a, 950(g).  
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III.  MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2009:  DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
On January 22, 2009, shortly after assuming office, President 
Barack Obama issued an executive order closing (eventually) the United 
States military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.
18
  He also 
criticized the procedures governing military commission and halted 
those trials that were then underway.
19
  The Executive Order also called 
for a committee to review whether and how Guantanamo Bay detainees 
should be prosecuted,
20
 despite the fact that Congress had already 
codified the procedures in the Military Commissions Act of 2006.   
A few months later, during a press conference on May 21, 2009, 
President Obama surprisingly endorsed Military Commissions as a 
legitimate means of trying war criminals.  He commented, “Military 
commissions have a history dating back to George Washington and the 
Revolutionary War.  They are an appropriate venue for trying detainees 
for violations of the laws of war.”  He stated that his changed view of 
Military Commissions did not constitute “a reversal on my part.”
21
    
President Obama endorsed the use of Military Commissions but 
also proposed several amendments to the Military Commission Act, 
which he said would “bring military commissions in line with the rule of 
law.”
22
  The proposed reforms generally included:  (1) banning the use 
of evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman, or degrading interrogation 
methods; (2) shifting the burden to prosecutors to prove that hearsay 
evidence is reliable (instead of placing the burden on opponents to prove 
it is unreliable); (3) giving “greater latitude” to defendants to select their 
own lawyers; and (4) generally providing “more protections” if 
defendants refuse to testify. 
23
  
A. Use of Potentially Coerced Statements 
The most substantive reform that President Obama proposed was 
the ban on certain types of evidence.  One significant problem with the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 is that it left open the door for 
prosecutors, in some instances, to rely on statements obtained through 
 
 18. Exec. Order No. 13492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the 
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, 74 F.R. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. § 4(c)(3). 
 21.  The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by The President on National 
Security (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-
the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
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coercion.
24
  Specifically, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
included a provision that allowed statements, in which the degree of 
coercion was disputed, to be admitted, so long as the statement was 
reliable, probative, and conducive to the interest of justice.
25
   
Under the Act, statements that the prosecutors obtained before 
December 30, 2005 were treated differently than those made after that 
date.  The Act barred the use of any statements made after December 30, 
2005 if the interrogation method used to obtain the statement would 
violate the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.
26
  But that bar applied only to statements made after 
December 30, 2005 (the date that Congress enacted the Detainee 
Treatment Act.)
27
   
The bizarre and unjust result of these two provisions is that they 
would allow prosecutors to rely on coerced evidence in some instances.  
The only trigger that would bar the use of such evidence was the passage 
of time.  Thus, detainees interrogated on December 29, 2005 could be 
convicted based on evidence procured through coercive means.
28
  In 
contrast, the law offered greater protections to a detainee interrogated on 
or after December 30, 2005.  
The Obama Administration presumably realized that these 
conflicting provisions were unfair and could lead to unjust convictions.  
To that end, Congress amended this provision in the Military 
Commissions Act of 2009, which includes a clear and simple ban on the 
use of statements obtained by torture or by any means that would violate 
the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
29
  
This prohibition mirrors U.S. law and is fairly categorized as a 
substantive amendment.  It is, quite clearly, a step in the right direction 
and a significant improvement to the Military Commissions Act of 2006.  
 
 24. Military Comm’n Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948r (b)-(c) (2006). 
 25. 10 U.S.C. § 948r (c)(1)-(2) (2006). 
 26. Id. § 948r(d). 
 27. Id. § 948r(d). 
 28. Information that the Government obtained by coercion can be reliable.  For example, in 
response to coercion, the detainee might say, “I buried the weapon under the Oak tree.”  The 
Government could then check under the Oak tree and find the weapon.  That evidence is what is 
called “fruit of the poisonous tree.”  That is, the evidence is the product of coercion.  Yes, the 
information can be reliable, but we should not admit that evidence because it is the product of 
coercion, and admitting it rewards the coercion.  No Article III court will admit such evidence 
unless the defendant offered the testimony voluntarily after Miranda warnings.   
 29. Detainee Treatment Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948r(a) (2009). 
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B. Latitude in Selecting Defense Lawyers 
While the categorical ban on evidence procured through coercion 
was an important and substantive amendment, other amendments that 
President Obama proposed and that Congress adopted are far less 
substantive.  One might even think of them as window dressing. 
For instance, the Obama Administration advanced amendments to 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 that would provide “greater 
latitude for detainees to select their lawyers.”
30
  However, a careful 
comparison of the 2006 and 2009 versions of the Military Commissions 
Act reveals that Congress adopted no substantive change to the law with 
respect to the detainees’ ability or right to select their lawyers.   
Congress adopted one provision that requires the Secretary of 
Defense to separately promulgate rules to evaluate the performance of 
defense counsel in capital cases.
31
  However, JAG lawyers—like every 
Military Officer—already receive periodic evaluations (Officer 
Evaluation Reports) and, just like lawyers in the private sector, their 
performance is constantly evaluated by higher-ranking lawyers within 
the firm, or in this case, within the military.  While it cannot hurt to more 
carefully, and more deliberately, review the work of defense lawyers 
involved in capital cases, the provision is duplicative and unlikely to 
significantly impact Military Commissions.  This is particularly true 
because none of the cases pending before Military Commissions are 
capital cases. 
The amended Military Commissions Act also includes a new 
provision that allows the detainee to request a particular military defense 
counsel by name, who will represent the detainee so long as that named 
defense lawyer is reasonably available.
32
  This provision will probably 
benefit some detainees, who are able to select a defense lawyer they 
regard as a good choice.  However, there is nothing particularly 
substantive about this provision either.  Randomly assigning defense 
counsel is a regularly accepted practice.  Indeed, U.S. criminal 
defendants do not have their pick of the litter.  The judge simply 
appoints a lawyer and, unless that lawyer has a legitimate conflict of 
interest, the trial proceeds with the appointed lawyer.  Hence, this new 
procedure will give detainees greater rights than any criminal defendant 
tried in state or federal court. 
 
 30. Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 21. 
 31. Military Comm’n Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948K (4)(c)(2) (2009). 
 32. 10 U.S.C. § 949c(2) (2009). 
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C. Additional 5th Amendment Protections 
Both the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and of 2009 include 
Fifth Amendment protections, which make clear that no defendant shall 
be required to testify against himself or herself.
33
  The only difference is 
that the language appears at a different place in the Military 
Commissions Act, and the 2009 version inserts the phrase “or herself”, 
presumably in an effort to clarify that the protection would apply to both 
male and female defendants—something that is already plainly clear.
34
   
The Military Commissions Act of 2009 includes additional 
restrictions on using statements of the accused that were properly 
obtained.  These statements may be admitted as evidence if the judge 
finds that the statements are reliable and probative; that they were made 
incident to lawful conduct during military operations or upon capture; 
and that the interest of justice is served by admitting the statements or 
that the statement was voluntarily given.  It specifies that whether a 
statement is “voluntary” will rest on a number of factors, including the 
circumstances; sophistication and education level of the individual 
detainee; and the lapse in time, change of place, or change of identity in 
the questioner.
35
  
While this provision helps to clarify the use of voluntary 
statements, it is only a more detailed telling of what already was the law.  
Under the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the judge already enjoyed 
discretion to admit statements based on the “totality of circumstances” 
that render the statement reliable,
36
 which would clearly encompass the 
factors that are now spelled out in the 2009 version.  Presumably, the 
outcome would be the same under both versions of the Military 
Commissions Act.   
 
 33. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 states “No person shall be required to testify 
against himself at a proceeding of a military commission under this chapter.” 10 U.S.C. § 948r(a) 
(2006).  The Military Commissions Act of 2009 states “No person shall be required to testify 
against himself or herself at a proceeding of military commission under this chapter.” 10 U.S.C. § 
948r(b) (2009). 
 34. 10 U.S.C. § 948r(b) (2009). 
 35. Id. § 948r(c)-(d). 
 36. Id. § 948r(a)-(d). 
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IV.  INDEFINITE DETENTION AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
37
 
The 2009 amendments to the Military Commissions Act, on the 
whole, provide additional procedural protections to the defendants.  
However, the problem is that these new rules are not generally 
applicable.  They apply only to a particular subset of detainees.  
President Obama, through other measures, has recently excluded some 
detainees from being eligible for trial by Military Commissions.  It 
seems that what he gives with one hand, he takes away with the other.  
What good is a robust body of law that can be set aside when the 
government thinks that it is inconvenient?  
While the Obama Administration initiated reforms to the Military 
Commissions Act, it simultaneously excluded some detainees from 
coverage under the Act.  The Obama Administration has determined that 
some detainees are too dangerous to ever be released, but that 
insufficient evidence exists to bring them to trial for their crimes.
38
  
These detainees are automatically ineligible for trial by military 
commission.  Instead, these detainees will face indefinite detention 
without a trial.   
Think about this:  the class of detainees who have the least 
protection are those detainees who have the least amount of evidence 
against them.  The government announces that they are dangerous, but 
the government does not have sufficient evidence to persuade a neutral 
fact-finder of that belief.  The detention for this class of detainees is also 
indefinite.  An administrative decision—not a trial—imposes indefinite 
imprisonment.
39
 
 
 37. For more detailed analysis of the Geneva Convention’s application to Guantanamo Bay, 
see Kyndra Rotunda, Applying Geneva Convention Principles to Guantanamo Bay, 43 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 1067 (2009). 
 38.  Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 21: 
Now, finally there remains the question of detainees at Guantanamo who cannot be 
prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people.  And I have to be honest 
here—this is the toughest single issue that we will face.  We’re going to exhaust every 
avenue that we have to prosecute those at Guantanamo who pose a danger to our 
country.  But even when this process is complete, there may be a number of people who 
cannot be prosecuted for past crimes, in some cases because evidence may be tainted, 
but who nonetheless pose a threat to the security of the United States.  Examples of that 
include people who’ve received extensive explosive training at al Qaeda training camps, 
or commanded Taliban troops in battle, or expressed their allegiance to Osama bin 
Laden, or otherwise made it clear that they want to kill Americans.  These are people 
who, in effect, remain at war with the United States.  Let me repeat:  I am not going to 
release individuals who endanger the American people. 
 39. Exec. Order No. 13567, Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantánamo Bay 
Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (Mar. 7, 2011), available 
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This imposition of indefinite detention without trial raises serious 
concerns under both International Law and U.S. Law.  Let us now turn 
to that issue.  
Geneva Convention III, relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, requires that detainees be repatriated “without delay” at the end of 
hostilities.
40
  The Official Commentary to that provision refers to the 
repatriation provision as “one of the most important Articles in the 
Convention,” observing that it is “intended to remedy very 
unsatisfactory situations.”
41
  Thus, the plain language of the Geneva 
Conventions makes clear that, at the end of active hostilities, all 
detainees not pending trial must be repatriated to their home countries.    
Holding detainees until the end of the war does not mean that the 
U.S. government can hold them indefinitely.  Neither the Geneva 
conventions nor international law provides for such discretion.  It means 
that the Government can hold the detainees to the end of the war. 
In a war like the present one, it is unclear when the war is over.  We 
do not expect it would end in a typical fashion.  It is unlikely that there 
will be a formal signing of a peace treaty with Al Qaeda..  However, the 
Supreme Court has anticipated that question and had provided an 
answer.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
42
 the Court held that the United States 
can hold detainees “for the duration of the conflict in which they were 
captured.”
 43
  Put another way, we can hold detainees until hostilities end 
and the troops come home.  At some point, the troops will no longer be 
fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Whether they return home because the 
war is won or because we just decide to leave, when the troops come 
back, the war ends.  At that point, international law provides that we 
must release the detainees.  
It is doubtful that President Obama can authorize the indefinite 
detention of prisoners captured during a war once the war ends.  The 
President appears to understand the problem.  In understanding the 
problem, President Obama seeks to hold individual detainees who are, 
“in effect,” at war with the United States because of their individual 
 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/executive-order-periodic-review-
individuals-detained-guant-namo-bay-nava (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
 40. Geneva Convention III, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 118-119. 
 41. Jean De Preux et al., Commentary III, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War 541 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960). 
 42. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 43. Id. at 518 (stating “We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited 
category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, 
is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and 
appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use”). 
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desires “to kill Americans.”
44
  Neither U.S. law nor international law 
recognizes that argument.  When WWII ended, there may well have 
been individual Germans who still had a desire “to kill Americans,” but 
we would not have had the power to detain them indefinitely simply 
because we determined, without trial, that they had evil in their hearts.  
A. Indefinite Detention in U.S. Prisons 
President Obama has lobbied Congress for authority to move 
detainees from the detention camp in Guantanamo Bay to maximum 
security prisons in the United States.  However, this plan has failed to 
gain traction with Congress.  On the contrary, Congress responded on 
December 22, 2010.  In responding, Congress inserted an amendment to 
the National Defense Authorization Act, which bans the use of federal 
funds to bring any detainee to the United States for trial or for detention. 
This statute mirrors our international obligations.  The Geneva 
Convention III, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, also 
prohibits housing detainees in U.S. maximum security prisons.  Geneva 
Convention III, article 22 speaks to the issue, stating that detainees 
“shall not be interned in penitentiaries.”  Furthermore, the Geneva 
Conventions also require particular conditions of detention, including 
the freedom of movement, access to a canteen, work opportunities, and 
payment in Swiss Francs.
45
  Put simply, maximum security U.S. prisons 
are incompatible with the conditions of detention required under the 
Geneva Conventions.  
V.  PROVISIONS AUTHORIZING THE DETENTION OF ENEMY 
COMBATANTS:  THEN AND NOW 
The Bush Administration adopted several procedural rules for 
detaining enemy combatants during the war.  These procedures 
responded to the plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
46
 which 
reaffirmed the earlier World War II decision in Ex parte Quirin.
47
 That 
case concluded that the United States may detain enemy combatants 
during war time without charging them with any crimes.  The Supreme 
Court, in Hamdi, specified that the procedures to determine whether a 
detainee is an enemy combatant need not be elaborate.  Indeed, the 
government can assume that the detainee is an enemy combatant unless 
 
 44. Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 21. 
 45. Geneva Convention III, supra note 34, art. 21-68.  
 46. Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507. 
 47. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
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he or she presents compelling evidence establishing otherwise.  The 
government can hold the detainee so long as the detainee has a fair 
opportunity to challenge his or her detention and present his or her view 
of matters.
48
 
Under President Bush, the Office of Review for Detained Enemy 
Combatants (OARDEC), established procedures for these hearings.
49
  It 
held hearings called Combatant Status Review Tribunals (or CSRTS).  
Although not required by the Supreme Court, or by any other legal 
provision, the United States appointed each detainee a personal 
representative to assist with the hearing.
50
  The United States also 
established Annual Review Boards, also under the direction of the 
Office of Review for Detained Enemy Combatants (OARDEC).
51
  It is 
an annual review board that hears detainee requests for release.  The 
standard for release is that the detainee no longer poses a threat to the 
United States.
52
 
The Obama Administration recently adopted similar procedures for 
detainees that it plans to hold indefinitely without trial—as opposed to 
simply detaining enemy combatants during war time.  Ironically, while 
the stakes are higher, and the result is indefinite detention, the Obama 
Administration affords fewer procedural protections for these hearings 
than the Bush Administration afforded to detainees undergoing CSRTS 
or ARBs. 
Specifically, the new procedures provide that detainees will receive 
a hearing within one year.
53
  At this hearing, they may have the 
assistance of an appointed representative.  If they would prefer a lawyer, 
they may have one at their own expense.
54
  The detainees will receive an 
unclassified version of the justification for continued detention and will 
have an opportunity to challenge that summary.
55
  In some cases, when 
 
 48. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507. 
 49. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy, 
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
 50. Id. at (c) (stating “Each detainee shall be assigned a military officer, with the appropriate 
security clearance, as a personal representative for the purpose of assisting the detainee in 
connection with the review process described herein”). 
 51. Memorandum from Gordon England, Designated Civilian Official, Dep’t of Def., 
Implementation of Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. 
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Sept. 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/d20040914adminreview.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
 52. Id. at Enclosure (3). 
 53. Executive Order, supra note 39, § 3(a).  
 54. Id. § 3(a)(2).  
 55. Id. § 3(a)(1).  
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the need to protect national security is particularly high, the detainees’ 
representative will receive only a summary of information, as opposed to 
the underlying information that justifies continued detention.
56
  After the 
initial hearing, detainees will then receive paper reviews every three 
years.
57
  The standard for continued detention is whether that detention 
is “necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of the 
United States.”
58
   
The procedures used by President Bush and those used by President 
Obama are similar, except that detainees under President Obama will 
face indefinite detention, without trial, and will only be allowed to 
challenge their detention once every three years.  The procedures, under 
President Bush, required annual reviews (hence the name Annual 
Review Boards) for all detainees simply to hold them during the war.   
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the use of these basic 
procedures in order to hold detainees during wartime, it is unlikely that it 
would find that such procedures are sufficient to hold enemy combatants 
indefinitely—not during a time of war.  Additionally, it is unlikely that 
the Supreme Court would permit fewer procedural protections for 
indefinite detention than what it required for detention during a time of 
war.  What the Obama Administration proposes is novel, and unknown 
to either U.S. or international law.   
Precedent suggests that the Supreme Court is unlikely to uphold the 
use of indefinite detention.  President Obama maintains that the legal 
authority for his proposed “law of war detention” is “detention 
authorized by Congress under the AUMF, as informed by the laws of 
war.”
59
  That assumes a very broad reading of the Authorization for the 
Use of Military Force.  However, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
60
 the Supreme 
Court considered whether Military Commissions under President Bush 
were a proper extension of the Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force.  It found, contrary to earlier Supreme Court Precedent, that 
Congress’s general permission to use force does not mean that Congress 
had also authorized the use of Military Commissions, and thus it 
invalidated the use of Military Commissions absent specific authority 
from Congress.   
It is unlikely that a Court would accept a broad reading of the 
AUMF in this context.  If a President does not have authority to hold 
 
 56. Id. § 3(a)(5).  
 57. Id. § 3(a)(8)(b).  
 58. Id. § 2.  
 59. Id. § 9(a). 
 60. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557 (2006). 
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Military Commissions during a time of war without specific authority 
from Congress, then surely the Executive lacks authority to indefinitely 
detain enemy soldiers even after the end of hostilities. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
During the Presidential Campaign, President Obama promised to 
close Guantanamo Bay and to abandon Military Commissions.  Shortly 
after taking office, he halted Military Commissions that were then 
underway, in order to explore other alternatives.
61
  Nearly three years 
later, Guantanamo Bay remains open, and President Obama has recently 
resumed Military Commissions.   
With the exception of a lone amendment to the Military 
Commissions Act, the procedures governing Military Commissions 
under President Obama and those under President Bush are virtually 
indistinguishable.  What is distinguishable is that now, under President 
Obama, many detainees will receive no procedural protections under the 
Military Commissions Act, but instead will face indefinite detention 
under rules that afford fewer procedural protections to detain someone 
for life than previously applied to temporarily hold detainees during war 
time.  What good are procedural protections if they are only selectively 
applied, and when that decision is left only to the captor?   
What the Obama Administration gives with one hand, it takes away 
with the other.  Ironically, the Obama Administration affords fewer 
procedural protections to justify holding detainees indefinitely than 
President Bush authorized in order to hold detainees during a time of 
war.  
President Obama proposes that, in those instances where 
insufficient evidence exists to bring detainees to trial, the United States 
may hold them indefinitely—even after the war ends.  This declaration is 
a step backwards, and could potentially put US. troops—and even 
civilians—at risk for indefinite detention by dictatorial regimes.  Take, 
for example, Iran’s recent detention and of three U.S. college students 
who accidentally wandered into Iran while hiking between Iran and 
Pakistan.  Ironically, Iran could have used American law to justify its 
own indefinite detention of our citizens. 
Iran maintained that the hikers are in fact U.S. spies.  The U.S. 
disagreed and repeatedly and rightfully, called for their release.  (Iran 
 
 61. For additional analysis of President Obama’s decision to halt trials, see Kyndra Rotunda, 
Halting Military Trials in Guantanamo Bay:  Can the President Call a Time-out?, 19 MICH. ST. J. 
INT’L L. 95 (2010). 
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eventually released the hikers.)  However, President Obama’s decision 
to hold enemy combatants indefinitely in the United States, based on our 
unsupported, and untried declaration that they are a danger to the United 
States, opens the door for Iran and others to do exactly the same thing.   
The United States holds itself out as a stalwart liberty and an 
advocate for procedural protections.  We consistently criticize countries 
that hold prisoners in substandard conditions that lack fundamental 
procedural protections.  It is difficult to understand how the United 
States can hold people it deems “dangerous” forever, while criticizing 
countries like Iran for doing the same thing to U.S. citizens.  Just as we 
believe that detainees are “dangerous” to our interests, Iran maintained 
that U.S. hikers were dangerous to its interests.  The United States 
should act cautiously when adopting provisions that allow indefinite 
imprisonment without a trial.  
The United States took one step forward when it improved 
procedural protections contained in the Military Commissions Act, and 
simultaneously took two steps back when it decided to exclude detainees 
from these same procedural protections and indefinitely detain them 
without any trial. 
